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consistent with the purpose of the Securities Act, it cannot be taken as a solution
of all employee-offering problems which may arise. An area in which the effect
of the entire complex of facts is all-important can scarcely be susceptible to
comprehensive self-executing regulation. Desirable as certainty may be, each
case will in large measure create its own rule, with the over-all purpose of the
Act as the principal guide.
SUPERVISION OF CHARITABLE TRUSTS
In 1943, New Hampshire became the first state to establish a comprehensive
system for the enforcement and supervision of charitable trusts.' Through enforcement of the donor's intent, mismanagement of trusts has been corrected,
and several millions of dollars in previously dormant trust funds have been put
to use for the benefit of the state's inhabitants.2 The present inquiry will be directed to -an examination of the reasons why similar legislation should be
adopted by other states; 3 it will also make definite suggestions regarding the
which should be offered
type of "Model Supervision of Charitable Trusts Act"
4
to the states by the Uniform Law Commissioners.
I
A charitable trust is a fiduciary relationship created by the expression of a
charitable intent in a will, indenture, or corporate charter. This relationship is
present whether the charity is large or small' and whether the class of persons
benefited is broad or narrow.6 It is essential that every state provide some system for supervising trustees because the nature of charitable trusts creates a
special handicap to the enforcement of the charitable purpose stated in the creating instrument. Normally enforcement of the civil law is predicated on the
assumption that when a breach of a legal obligation occurs, the injured party,
motivated by his own self-interest, will inform the court of the breach and del N.H. Rev. Laws

1943, c. 24, § 13a-13n.

2Letter from N.H. Dir. of Char. Trusts (March 25, 1953). This letter and others cited

hereafter were received in reply to questionnaires sent to the Attorneys General of states which
had provided or were about to provide comprehensive reform, as well as to the "partial reform"
states. This material and all legislative and executive papers are on file at the Council of State
Governments (Project File: Charitable Trusts, 1953), 1313 E. 60th St., Chicago, Ill.
R.I. Pub. Laws, c. 2617 (1950) established a similar system of state supervision for
Rhode Island.
4 On August 8, 1953, the National Association of Attorneys General requested the Uniform
Law Commissioners to suggest state legislation concerning regulation of charitable trusts.
Alternative preliminary drafts were submitted to the National Association, and on December
10, 1952, that group resolved that the development of alternative "Uniform Acts" which provide for either permissive or mandatory regulation "would enable the states to select the form
which best meets their individual needs and requirements." Proceedings of the Conference of
the National Association of Attorneys General 155 (1952).
s 3 Scott, Trusts § 375.1 (1939).
6
Ibid., at § 375.2.
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mand its correction. But enforcement of the law of charities is made difficult because courts cannot depend upon a self-interested individual to report breaches
of trust, for charitable beneficiaries are always indefinite, 7 usually very numerous and scattered, and often the recipients of very small individual benefits.
Moreover, the charitable trustee is not obligated to benefit any single member
of the class of indefinite beneficiaries named in the trust instrument, so the individual beneficiary has no legal "right" to receive the gift. The only persons
harmed by the inaction or defalcation of the trustee are the beneficiaries. If they
have no standing in court to sue,8 the courts are without a "fact-finding" and
"suit-bringing" party who will supervise and enforce
the execution of the
fiduciary duty.
Even if the Attorney General or some other officer were empowered to bring
suit when asked, the obstacle of an imperfect fact-finding procedure would still
remain. Most beneficiaries would not even know they were harmed because
they lack knowledge of either (1) the existence of the trust, (2) the fact that
they were intended beneficiaries, (3) the fact that they were probable recipients
of the benefits, or (4) the investments, expenses or internal management of the
charity. Even if the beneficiaries themselves were given standing to sue, many
breaches of fiduciary duty would still go undiscovered, not only because the
beneficiaries lack such knowledge, but because they lack the necessary pecuniary interest as well. 9
Ultimately then, any system of law which purports to enforce charitable
trusts must provide some method for overcoming the natural handicaps to enforcement. The systems devised under Roman and British law provide useful
examples of procedures which can supply effective supervision.
The Romans had a comprehensive system of enforcement which centered the
responsibility for the supervision of trustees in the bishop of the local church. 0
He superintended their management and was required "to have a watchful eye
over them to remove those who were negligent, and in such cases to appoint
other trustees who had the true fear of God in their hearts."" The bishop, in
turn, was made responsible to the archbishop or the Province; and the whole
hierarchy was reviewable by the people, for every citizen was empowered to
make a judicial complaint that the testator's intention was not fulfilled. The
7

Ibid., at § 364.
8 Averill v. Lewis, 106 Conn. 582, 138 Ati. 815 (1927); Association For Relief R.A.I.F.
v. Beekman, 21 Barb. (N.Y.) 565 (1854), and cases cited 62 A.L.R. 881, 883, 124 A.L.R. 1237,
1238. However, a beneficiary who has a special interest in the performance of a charitable
trust can maintain a suit for its enforcement. Canon v. Stephens, 18 Del. Ch. 276, 159 Ati. 234
(1932). In either case, the Attorney General is usually a necessary party to the action. Strickland v. Weldon, 28 Ch. Div. 426 (1885); Larkin v. Wikoff, 75 N.J. Eq. 462, 72 At. 98 (1909).
9Often, beneficiaries are "poor" or "needy," but ev~s if they can find money to sue, the
cost of a lawsuit is often more than the tiny benefit which the plaintiff may receive if the court
corrects a breach of trust.
1010 Am. L. Reg. 135 (1862).
"Ibid., at 136.
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bishop was then warned that by his negligence, he not only would risk the punishment of Heaven, but would suffer from the wrath of the Emperor as well."
Thus the Roman system gave to a local official, who was probably already
acquainted with the general facts, the power of investigating and regulating the
management of charities. It further provided several checks on the bishop and,
through the citizen's complaint, supplemented his investigitions.
British attempts to overcome the internal handicaps to enforcement fall into
three periods. Before 1601, the Chancellor's equity powers were available to
of
enforce charitable uses, and the Attorney General, representing the interests
3
enThis
them.
the community, could bring suits "on information" to enforce
forcement was sporadic, however, and many abuses of trust were not discovered.14
During the period from 1601 to 1853, attempts were made to "patch up" the
law by the enactment of remedial statutes. The famous Statute of Charitable
Uses 6 gave the Chancellor power to appoint commissioners who would inquire
into and correct abuses of trust. The commission system, however, was unsystematic, cumbersome and expensive and in 1812, two new attempts were made
to patch up the old law. One act tried to put the public in the investigatory position by providing for summary procedure if two individuals petitioned in the
the
Chancery Court with the approval of the Attorney--or Solicitor-General;16
17
registraSuch
office.
county
a
in
charities
all
of
other act required registration
for systematic "fact-finding," but apparently
tion might have provided a means
8
observed.1
generally
not
it was
The inadequacy of these partial reforms is shown by the fact that when Parliament appointed a commission in 1818 to inquire into the administration of
charities, the confusion was so great that it took them 19 years and 37 volumes
9
to make their report.
Finally, in 1853, a comprehensive Charitable Trusts Act was passed in which
a Board of Charity Commissioners was set up to supervise and enforce charitable trusts.2" Since then, numerous modifications and amendments have been
1 Ibid. Where funds were given for the redemption of Roman captives, the bishop had to
notify the Governor of the Province in writing at the time the funds were received; after one
year, the bishop was required to report the number of captives redeemed and the amount
paid for them. Ibid., at 135-36.
133 Scott, Trusts 1922, 2052 (1939).
14The very title of the remedial statute enacted in 1601 was "An Act to Redress the Misemployment of Lands, Goods, and Stocks of Money Heretofore Given to Certain Charitable
Uses."
1543 Eliz. I, c. 4 (1601).
15Charities Procedure Act, 1812, 52 Geo. III, c. 101.
17Charitable Donations Registration Act, 1812, 52 Geo. 1II, c. 102.
18 4 Halsbury's Encyclopedia of the Laws of England 244-45 (1939).
193 Scott, Trusts 1923 (1939).
20Charitable Trusts Act, 1853, 15 and 16 Vict., c. 137.
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made, most of them being consolidated in the Charitable Trusts Acts of 1925.21
The board has both administrative and judicial powers. It may demand accounts, supervise administration, establish schemes, and punish for contempt.
It exercises the power of Chancery where the annual income of the charity is
less than £50 or where trustees apply for aid, but its primary use of these powers
is in noncontentious cases, for the important disputes are to be left to the
courts.22 As a result of this comprehensive plan, England now reports very little
mismanagement in charitable trusts.2 3
In America, the states have generally failed to provide a good substitute for
the lack of a "party-plaintiff" to discover the facts and call on the court to
remedy the trustee's failures. Most states still adhere to common law methods
of enforcement similar to those used in England before 1601. Others have attempted partial reform, and a third group is composed of the two states which
have a comprehensive plan for the supervision of charitable trusts.
Although the states initially adopted the "applicable" parts of the English
Common Law system, the American problem was complicated by the absence
of the prerogatives of the King.2 4 Under the English common law most of the
King's powers and many of the fact-finding duties that pertained to the enforcement of charitable trusts were centered in the Chancellor. He acted as
personal delegate of the Crown in exercising the power to appoint commissioners
to investigate charities. Where money was given to trustees and no definite
charitable objects were specified,25 the Chancellor, acting for the Crown, executed the trust under a scheme and cared for the administration of the charity. 25
In addition, he exercised his normal function of hearing all the controversies
which involved these trusts whether they directly concerned enforcement of a
fiduciary obligation or not.' 7 He was, therefore, often in contact with many of
these trusts and although neither he nor the Attorney General received reports
from the trustees, the Chancellor was in a position to appoint commissioners
whenever a matter appeared directly or collaterally that needed investigation.
The primary role of the Attorney General was to represent the charitable trust
in the argument of cases. Although the Chancellor could begin an action through
the commission system without the aid of the Attorney General, it was often
more convenient to ask that officer to bring the suit "on information."28 Thus,
2115 and 16 Geo. V, c. 27 (1925).
22 2 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees 1018 (1935).
2"215 L.T. 32 (Jan. 16, 1953).
24 Fowler, Law of Charitable Uses, Trusts and Donations in New York 43, 47 (1896).
Many of the functions of the King were "inapplicable" to American conditions. Ibid., at 48.
23 Story, Equity § 1581, 1583 (Lyon's ed., 1918).
21 Ibid., at § 1583.
27 Ibid., at § 1582.
28Fowler, op. cit. supra note 24, at 36. In Bailiff's of Burford v. Lenthall, 2 Atk. 552 (1743),
it was pointed out that when the court was reviewing matters brought before commissioners,
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although the name "Attorney General" appeared in numerous cases, it is very
probable that the real "fact-finder" was a commission, an interested party or
the Chancellor himself.
The American chancellor did not possess the special powers granted by the
King and could not begin an action by appointing commissioners even if a
breach of trust appeared collaterally and needed prompt attention. 29 Thus the
heart of the English enforcement system was absent, and the Attorney General
came to be regarded as the "guardian" of public charitable trusts in this country, for he was the only person who could properly start an action.
Before an action could be brought, however, the fact finding process had to
uncover its need. The "common law" jurisdictions have assumed that interested
parties would notify the Attorney General whenever the facts called for his intervention. However, it has been shown that to expect the beneficiaries of a
charitable trust to provide that information is unrealistic, and in fact, such
complaints have been either non-existent 3" or have occurred with great infrequency.3 1 Other sources of information, such as trustee reports, personal investigations by the Attorney General or court supplied memoranda are either unused or barren of results. In the common law states, reports have not been required, and it is unlikely that the trustee would voluntarily notify himself of his
own breach of trust.Y Investigations have not been conducted, 33 nor has the
it could put the action in the shape of an original bill in which neither side is bound by what
appeared before the commissioners but may set forth new matter if they think proper. "This
has made the court all along consider it as an original cause, or otherwise, the court would
have known nothing of the merits. Therefore, the court has mixed the jurisdiction of bringing
information in the name of the Attorney General, with the jurisdiction given them under the
statute and proceed either way, according to their discretion." Instead of wasting time and
money by appointing commissioners and then examining the action as an original cause on
appeal, the Chancellor found it easier to ask the Attorney General to bring the action in the
first place.
2
2Jenkins v. Berry, 119 Ky. 350, 83 S.W. 594 (1904). and 122 Ky. 311, 92 S.W. 10 (1906);
State ex rel. Heddens v. Rusk 236 Mo. 201, 139 S.W. 199 (1911) (Chancellor's jurisdiction
must be invoked by someone else).
10"There has not even been sporadic action by the Attorney General in Rhode Island,"
testimony of Attorney General William E. Powers quoted in Report of Special Committee
To Study the Laws of This State With Respect To Charitable-Trust-So-Called 7 (1950).
In Nevada, there have been no complaints in the last 22 years. Letter from Nev. Att'y Gen.
(April 23, 1953).
31The American Attorney General's enforcement of charitable trusts is sporadic. 3 Scott,
Trusts 2053 (1939). In North Carolina, the Attorney General thinks there have been ten cases
in the last ten years. Letter from N.C. Att'y Gen. (March 26, 1953). The number of complaints by citizens or interested parties have been "relatively few" in Texas. Letter from Tex.
Ass't Att'y Gen. (April 10, 1953). "From none per year to two or three" complaints were received in Ohio. Letter from Ohio Ass't Att'y Gen. (April 9, 1953). In Indiana, the Attorney
General instituted about six cases in the last six years. Letter from Ind. Att'y Gen. (March 31,
1953).

1'However, several trustees have voluntarily sent copies of their yearly court reports to
the Attorney General of Indiana. Letter from Ind. Att'y Gen. (March 31, 1953).
33 The Attorneys General of Ohio, Indiana, Nevada, Wisconsin, Texas, and North Carolina do not inspect or investigate any sort of records but rely for the most part on complaints.
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practice of a liaison between the Attorney General and the courts been developed unofficially. However, a few states have recognized the possible value of
such liaison and have passed statutes requiring charitable trusts to report annually to a local court which in turn, would notify the Attorney General when a
34
breach of trust occurred.
Questionnaires were sent to these "partial reform" states to see if they fared
better in obtaining the much needed facts about the activities of trustees than
the "common law" states which relied entirely on sporadic complaints by interested parties. The reply of North Carolina is revealing. There a trustee is required to file annual reports to the superior court,35 but if he fails to do so or if
the property is mismanaged through negligence or fraud, it is the duty of the
clerk of that court to notify the Attorney General or State Solicitor. The Attorney General then has the duty to bring an action in the name of the state, calling
on the trustee to render a full and minute account of his administration of the
trust fund.36 He may also compel the trustee to apply the income as the trust
7

requires.

Although this statute would seem to supply the need for a fact-finding mechanism necessary for supervision and enforcement, the Hon. Harry McMullan
of North Carolina writes:
No notice has ever been given this office by any clerk of the superior court under G.S.
36-20 that any charitable trust is being violated in any county, and no action has ever
been brought by the State under authority of that section. I am not informed as to
the extent which charitable trusts comply with the provisions of G.S. 36-19 in the
various counties of the State but I am of the opinion that very few reports have been
filed as required by this section.38
Indiana has an equally comprehensive statute, but the Attorney General
writes, "I know of no specific instance in which any proceeding was instituted
as a result of information sent by a court." 39
In these two states, as well as others, 4 reports to be submitted to a local
court have failed to provide the Attorney General with the necessary informaLetters cited note 31 supra, and letters from Wis. Ass't Att'y Gen. (March 31,1953), and from
Nev. Att'y Gen. (April 23, 1953). Massachusetts is exceptional, for there, the Attorney General passes upon all accounts which are filed by trustees before they are approved by the
court. Letter from Mass. Ass't Att'y Gen. (May 8, 1953).
34Ind. Stat. Ann. § 7-714 (Burns, 1933); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. c. 68 § 15 (Michie Supp.,
1946) (Report to Dep't Pub. Welfare); Nev. Comp. Laws § 7718.21 (Hillyer Supp., 1945);
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 36-19 (Michie, 1950); Ore. Comp. Laws Ann. § 73-101 (1940); Wis. Stat.

§ 317.06 (1945).
35 N.C.

Gen. Stat. § 36-19 (Michie, 1950).
7
" Ibid., at § 36-20.
3 Ibid., at § 36-23.3.
38Letter from N.C. Att'y Gen. (March 26, 1953).
3"Letter from Ind. Att'y Gen. (March 31, 1953).
4
0No actions were initiated as a result of court reports in Nevada, two in Wisconsin (1952),
"few, if any" in Massachusetts, and none in Ohio or Texas. Letters cited note 33 supra.
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tion. In Rome and England, enforcement was effectuated by providing the enforcing agency with direct information about the activities of trustees. While
the former system relied on the local bishop's immediate contact with trustees,
the English established a specialized central authority which needed to receive
reports from trustees if it was to discover mismanagement. If the American
Attorney General is to retain this duty of enforcing charitable trusts, he also
should receive direct reports from trustees. Perhaps one reason why the Attorney General has not received information through the courts is that these bodies
lack specialized personnel to analyze the reports and investigate questionable
matters. Skilled personnel in the office of the Attorney General should be given
states
these duties. Direct reports have already proved their worth in the two
less
with
Island
where comprehensive supervision has been established. Rhode
matters
12
had
and
than 500 trusts registered has already closed 35 court cases
4
to registration there had been no
pending at the time of its first report; ' prior
2
a conactions initiated by the Attorney General.1 Furthermore, supervision is
last
the
during
adjudicated
stant task, for New Hampshire reported 61 cases
4
how
determine
to
impossible
is
biennium with nine cases pending. " Although it
"parmany trusts or breaches of trust actually exist in the "common law" and
44
indistates
"supervision"
the
in
tial reform" states, the abundant litigation
unsupervised.
are
trusts
wherever
cates that there may be many latent lawsuits
Ill
Before 1900, the total value of charitable contributions might not have been
large enough to warrant the establishment of specialized enforcement machinery
by individual states. But since then, the national wealth has greatly increased,45
to become philanthropists.
and the charitable instinct has caused wealthy men
This instinct has been further stimulated by the imposition of a semi-confisthe
catory tax structure. Although there are no accurate statistics concerning
present total value of charitable trusts,

46

a few figures will indicate that the

The comstates can no longer regard charitable trusts as a de minimus matter.

trusts is over $136,000,000.4
bined value of Rhode Island and New Hampshire
4 Report of the Administrator of Charitable Trusts (Jan., 1951-Dec., 1952).
4 Report of Special Committee, op. cit. supra note 30.
43lN.H.Attorney General's Report (1950-52).
44The Attorneys General do not even have information about the number of trusts in their
state. Letters cited note 33 supra.
46 Men like Andrew Carnegie believed that the millionaire should be "a trustee for the
of Wealth 18
poor.... The man who dies ...rich dies disgraced." Carnegie, The Gospel
to charity
dollars
million
700
Rockefellers
the
and
(1906). Carnegie donated 200 million dollars
even before the period of high taxes.
46According to a 1932 survey discussed by Blackwell in "The Charitable Corporation and
dollars in property and
the Charitable Trust," 24 Wash U.L.Q. 1 (1938), over nine billion billions
have been given
many
but
trustees,
philanthropy's
by
handled
being
were
endowment
then.
since
47 Letter from N.H. Dir. of Char. Trusts (March 25, 1953); Report of the Administrator
of Charitable Trusts (Jan., 1951-Dec., 1952) (R.I.).
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In Massachusetts, a survey in 1935 revealed more than 50,000 bequests to
charity totaling $48,000,000 in one county alone. 48 On the other hand "foundations,"' 4 a type of charity usually in the corporate form, 50 have a total national
value of about two billion dollars."
It seems strange that the states should have neglected their responsibility for
supervising the private management of these quasi-public funds, especially
when the state and federal governments have so generously subsidized charities
by exempting them from taxation. How much of this "public property" has
been wasted or diverted as a result of this negligence is a speculative matter,
but modern uses of the charitable trust device give some indication of the
shocking consequences of "lenient" state enforcement.
Before 1950, the high tax rates, the exception of charitable gifts from taxation, and the "lenient" policy of state supervision over charities combined to
make the charitable trust a popular tax-saving device. Numerous articles appeared explaining in detail the advantages of various tax saving schemes such
as "giving" to one's own charitable foundation, while at the same time retaining
control of the gift. 2 The Revenue Act of 195051 specifically attacked these
schemes by providing for revocation of the tax exemption when charities engaged in such activities. Since a revised system of charitable trust enforcement
must operate under continued federal tax regulation, the revision should consider its relationship to the Revenue Act of 1950.
Before the 1950 Act was passed, the charitable trust was used to avoid estate
taxes, to reduce yearly income taxes, and to retain and increase capital. In order
to keep property in control of the family and avoid the necessity of selling much
of the estate to pay taxes, property was donated to a charitable foundation controlled by the testator's family. In this way "white elephants" which were difficult to sell, works of art, country estates, patents, and closely held stocks and
4 Report and Recommendations for Legislation of Former Attorney General Bushnell, 30
Mass. L.Q. 22, 24 (May, 1945). The Attorney General of Massachusetts estimates that the
present value of charitable trusts in the whole state is now about 100 million dollars. Letter
from Mass. Att'y Gen. (May 8, 1953).
49A "foundation" has been described as a non-profit, non-governmental organization
having a principal fund of its own, established for charitable, educational, or similar purposes.
Eaton, Charitable Foundations, Tax Avoidance, and Business Expediency, 35 Va. L. Rev.
809, 987, at 814 (1949).
50The Modem Philanthropic Foundation: A Critique and a Proposal, 59 Yale L.J. 477,
481 (1950); Clark, How To Get the Most Out of the Deduction for Charitable Contributions
by Individuals and Business, 6 N.Y.U. Inst. Fed. Tax 1015 (1948).
51Estimated by Sloan Foundation, N.Y. Times, p. 21, col. 1 (Aug. 17, 1949).
5"How to Have Your Own Foundation, 36 Fortune, No. 2, p. 108 (Aug. 1947); Eaton,
Charitable Foundations, Tax Avoidance and Business Expediency, 35 Va. L. Rev. 809, 987
(1949); Lasser, How Tax Laws Make Giving to Charity Easy (1948); Clark, How to Get the
Most Out of the Deduction for Charitable Contributions by Individuals and Business, 6
N.Y.U. Inst. Fed. Tax 1015 (1948); Harriss, Taxes and Philanthropy, 70 Trusts and Estates 117
(1940).
" Pub. L. No. 814, 81st Cong., 2d Sess., approved Sept. 23, 1950.
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investments could be carved out of the estate as exempt charitable gifts and yet
54
remain-in the hands of trustees friendly to the family. This practice had the
additional advantage of leaving the estate more liquid than it would have been
if such property had to be evaluated and sold for taxes. An extra tax saving
would result if appreciated property could be given for it could be exempted
from the estate tax at its present value and yet the interim capital gain was not
taxable.w
Controlled charities had additional advantages in that the income from the
donated property might be largely eaten up by "expenses" which served no
charitable purpose. Management fees, compensation for services rendered to5 the
charity and the like could easily be paid to relatives, servants, and friends. " In
addition, dealings with certain persons or companies may be conducted on very
liberal terms, as long as all such expenses and dealings were "reasonable." In
fact, even the beneficiaries selected by such a charity could be friends of the
donor or trustee, for it was not hard to select a class of beneficiaries so "general"
that the trustees or directors could follow the words of the trust and still have
57
considerable discretion as to whom to benefit. Charities were also used to reduce yearly income taxes during the donor's lifetime. Corporations and individuals could establish a foundation, make year end donations of controllable
property, and reduce their net taxable income by 5% and 15% respectively.
Furthermore, the income from the donated property would be tax free and
available for "expenses."
High tax rates had depleted many of the traditional supplies of accumulated
capital, so some men who wished to expand their company's activities looked
5
to charitable trusts for the necessary venture capital. By trading on the charity's tax exemption and allowing its income to accumulate, capital was rapidly
created. One scheme was to set up a charity and have the trustees borrow
money, buy a factory from the company, lease back the factory, and pay off the
59
loan out of the proceeds from the tax-exempt rentals. Another method would
be to donate stock to the charity and then increase the assets of the charity by
high tax-exempt dividends until enough money was accumulated so that the
charity could either buy the stock of a competitor and sell it cheaply to the
company at any convenient time, or make unsecured or poorly secured loans of
capital to the company. 0 Of course, the company could always sell its assets to
the charity at a loss and take a tax deduction; the charity could then sell those
assets at a tax-exempt profit and use the proceeds to buy and lease back more
company property. 6' The trustees of such charities were usually exempted from
64 See discussion by Eaton, op. cit. supra note 49, at 836-38, 990-93.

Ibid.,
h at 833, 990.
"Ibid., at 993.

,, Ibid., at 1013 et seq.

97 Ibid., at 994-95.
"Ibid., at 1005, 1022.

60Ibid., at 1011-1013.
61Ibid., at 1021.
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liability for negligence in those transactions by a specific clause in the trust.6 2
Most of these devices were explored by Royal Little in his fabulous manipulations of Textron, Inc.,6 3 and were also used in varying degrees by others including educational institutions and insurance companies. 64
These tax saving .devices were widely criticized as "loopholes" in the tax
law. 65 However, except for the problem of charities trading on their tax exemption by borrowing money for lease-back transactions, most of the difficulties
arose because of the "loophole" in the charity law. If trustees had been adequately supervised, unreasonable accumulations and expenses would have been
largely prevented, and the use of the corpus and income by the donor instead of
the beneficiaries would have been minimized. Since the state did not provide
such supervision, however, Congress had no choice but to "rush right in where
experts feared to tread" and enact a law which would preserve the policy of encouraging private philanthropy and yet halt the use of charities as tax saving
devices. The complicated Revenue Act of 1950 attempted to solve this problem
by providing for revocation of the tax exemption whenever charities engaged in
the activities which had been subject to abuse. While the details of this Act have
been fully criticized and explained elsewhere,61 the main question to be considered here is the effect of the Act upon charities and charitable trust enforcement.
One immediate effect of the Act upon charities is that its tax exemption is
denied when the trustee, for example "engages in any other transaction which
results in a substantial diversion of its income or corpus to; the creator of such an
organization (if a trust); a person who has, made a substantial contribution..... -67 In effect, a new standard for "reasonable management" has been
established for trustees, and the tax collector, not the Attorney General, has
been given the task of interpreting and "enforcing" that standard. But the
"enforcement" weapon prescribed by the Revenue Act not only fails to enforce
the charitable intent by punishing trustees for imprudent management, it
actually deprives the charity itself of an amount of money equal to the tax
exemption because of a trustee's wrongful mismanagement! The 1950 Act may
even have discouraged charitable contributions, for there is always the possibility that the wrongful act of a trustee may cause the charity to lose its exemption; in that event, contributions by persons unaware of that fact would be

61
Yale L.J., op. cit. supra note 50 at 496.

63 Ibid., at 492-97; see also discussion of Textron activities by Eaton, op. cit. supra note 49,
at 1022-1034.
64 Eaton, op. cit. supra note 49, at 1000-1002.
" Ibid., at 1034. Eaton speaks of the study of tax exempt organizations "with an eye to
closing some of the loopholes, especially those in 101(6)."
6Eaton, Charitable Foundations and Related Matters Under the 1950 Revenue Act,
37 Va. L. Rev. 1, 253 (1951); Colleges, Charities, and the Revenue Act of 1950, 60 Yale L.J.
851 (1951); Hilnski, Some Comments on the Revenue Act of 1950, 99 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 455,
610 (1951); Morgan, Present Status of "Exempt" Corporations, 31 Taxes 296 (1953).
67 Pub. L. No. 814, op. cit. supra note 53, at § 321(a), adding Int. Rev. Code § 162(g) (2) (A),
(B); and § 331, adding Int. Rev. Code § 3813(a), (b) (6).
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68
taxable retroactively. In short, the 1950 Act punishes charities instead of
punishing abuses of trust; it neither encourages private philanthropy nor supervises trustees.
If a state enacted a Model Supervision of Charitable Trust Act, the Attorney
General would be able to protect charities from the special interests of donors,
trustees and the tax collector. He could insist on prudent management by
trustees and prevent them from engaging in activities which would jeopardize
the charity's tax exemption. Even though the Revenue Act remained in force to
guard against abuses of the federal tax structure, the Attorney General could
virtually eliminate the necessity for its use by insuring that the charitable intent
is observed in all charitable trusts."' Supervision, therefore, would close most of
the loopholes that the tax law was so clumsily trying to correct. Most important
of all, it would carry out the policy of encouraging private philanthropy in a
straightforward and beneficial manner.
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pelling efficient management by trustees, the government would protect the
community interest in the benefits from these quasi-public funds and would insure that its own tax exemption "contribution" be used to the utmost advantage. Charity itself, receives the greatest benefits from supervision. The results
in New Hampshire are exemplary:
Trust funds which lay dormant for one reason or another came to life again for the
benefit of charities ....

Probate accounts by trustees became more numerous and

complete. Some trustees had not reported for periods ranging from five to twenty
years ....

Nondistributed funds were turned over to the intended charities, invest-

ments became more prudent, with the corpus not speculatively sacrificed to income
and vice versa. Stability of investment consistent with reasonable income was the
standard laid down for trustees. The charges made for trustees' fees were controlled

2
Pub. L. No. 814, op. cit. supra note 53, at § 321(a), adding Int. Rev. Code § 162(g)( ) (E),
(F); and § 331, adding Int. Rev. Code § 3813(e), (f).
69Even if the charity had already lost its exemption, the Attorney General, by timely action
could make sure that it was immediately reinstated under Pub. L. No. 814, op. cit. supra
note 53, at § 321(a), adding Int. Rev. Code § 162(g)(2)(D); and § 331, adding Int. Rev.
Code § 3813(d).
70 In New Hampshire, a $38,000 gift to the state hospital was assured because of alert
supervision in that state. N.H. Attorney General's Report (1946-48).
68
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so that trust funds might not be exploited for personal gain and to the detriment of
the charities involved. In one case, the trustees were taking an unreasonable per cent
of the annual income for fees in disregard of a specific provision in the will allowing
much less for their services. The bad practice of accumulating a large portion of the
income each year was stopped.. In one case income was accumulated in the sum of
$100,000 over a period'of eighteen years.... Petitions for cy pres application of funds
left for objects no longer practicable were also more frequent. In one case a fund of
nearly a million dollars, with only two years to go before a testamentary limitation of
twenty years would have become effective, with resulting reversion to the estate, was
awakened and immediate steps were taken to prevent forfeiture and to insure its application for the benefit of the inhabitants of New Hampshire in the field of education.n
The biennial reports of the New Hampshire supervision department are replete
with other examples of the stimulation of charities. 72 In thelong run, supervision
undoubtedly would encourage more gifts to charity, for donors would be assured
that the money they give would reach the intended beneficiaries. 7
Some of the major objections to comprehensive supervision were expressed
when Massachusetts considered its adoption in 1945.74 The Judicial Council was
requested to investigate its desirability 5 and in arguing against supervision said
that the proposed Division of Public Charities would be a "new 'bureau' of
enormous size and scope of authorized activities, capable of practical expansion
of assumed power with all the possible, conceivable, and proverbial insolence of
office which the imagination of some future officials in the department might
'
suggest."76
When government acts to promote the general welfare, bureaucratic
size and insolence are possible. It is the possibility of such defects arising from
the machinery of particular legislation which must be weighed against the results it is expected to achieve. The size of the "bureaucracy" in New Hampshire
is a part-time director and a registrar; 77 in Rhode Island, only three persons are
employed in its Division. 78 New Hampshire reports that its policy of friendly
supervision is well received by all, including donors, trustees, and beneficiaries. 79
Secondly, it was argued that supervision would increase state expenses.8 0
There will, of course, be some expense involved in supervision. New Hampshire
supervises a trust corpus of 75 million dollars at a cost of $8,610 per year.8' It
" N.H. Attorney General's Report (1944-46).
72E.g., a school plan was adopted so that $750,000 in trust funds could be put to work
after they bad accumulated for 25 years. N.H. Attorney General's Report (1946-48). Under
the present tax law, the fund might have been taxed instead of simulatedi
73N.H. Attorney General's Report (1946-48).
74Report and Recommendations for Legislation of Former Attorney General Bushnell,
30 Mass. L.Q. 22 (May, 1945).
76Judicial Council, Discussion of Recommendations, 30 Mass. L.Q. 42, 45 (Dec., 1945).
76Ibid., at 46.
77Letter from N.H. Dir. of Char. Trusts (March 25, 1953).
78Letter from R.I. Admin. of Char. Trusts (March 24, 1953).
7,N.H. Attorney General's Report (1950-52).
80Mass. L.Q., op. cit. supra note 75, at 47.
81Letter cited note 77 supra. In Rhode Island, it costs $14,000 to supervise a trust corpus of
61 million dollars. Letter cited note 78 supra.
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is also costly for a state to allow public funds to be wasted or unused. "In 1946
and 1947, steps were taken to obtain the required trustee's reports in the Elisha
Munsell Trust and as a result the prompt payment of $38,000 to the State Hospital was assured. 8' 2 This one private gift paid the expense of over four years of
supervision. Larger states might prefer a 151an proposed for Texas whereby the
cost is partially defrayed by percentage registration and filing fees4 from the
trusts themselves. 83 The savings from supervision are cumulative and continuous. After almost ten years of supervision, New Hampshire reports, "Dor'
mant funds still come up for attention."
It was also said that, sooner or later, any issue requiring the representation of
the Attorney General will come to his attention either by a complaint of interested parties, a petition for instructions, an application of cy pres, or some other
means.88 It has already been shown that in most states, complaints do not
87
reach the Attorney General. In many instances, the delay may cause a complete loss of property because of a reverter or through negligence.
Next it was urged that because some trusts need attention there is no reason
why the others "should be subjected to this interminable, and very probably in
88
inquisitions."
the future, intolerable interference and burden of reports and
Supervision would involve some additional expense to each charity. However,
since adequate records are indispensible to a well managed charity, the required
annual reports ordinarily would involve a mere transfer of information to a form
supplied by the Attorney General. Moreover, states already requiring reports
to a court could standardize the two forms, so that duplicate reports could be
filed with almost no additional cost. Since the proposal Act would give the Attorney General no right to interfere with lawful management, "inquisitions"
would be in order only should the reports indicate the need.
Finally, the Council pointed out that the English comprehensive supervison
statute includes powers of changing the management of the trust in ways which
would be unconstitutional in Massachusetts. "The fact of these arrangements
should
in England do not persuade us that a similar centralized establishment
89
as history.
well
as
differ
conditions
where
here
be adopted
It is true that the English application of cy pres and other equity powers is
much broader than the more limited use they receive in America. However, a
Model Supervision of Charitable Trusts Act would not change the existing
substantive law of charities in any given state. The courts would still decide
whether to punish the trustee, change the management or dismiss the suit.

82N.H. Attorney General's Report (1946-48).
83

Texas H.B. No. 538, §§ 10, 15 (1953).
Property that is quickly recovered from loss through mismanagement will increase total
income over a period of years.
8 N.H. Attorney General's Report (1950-52).
8
6Mass. L.Q., op. cit. supra note 75, at 51.
87 See material cited note 31.
88
s Ibid., at 52.
Mass. L.Q., op. cit. supra note 75, at 46.
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Even the Attorney General's duty of investigating and suing to correct
breaches of trust would remain essentially unchanged. The main purpose of the
Act would be to provide adequate machinery for the execution of those duties.
The success of the English system of centralized reporting90 would seem to be
a reason for adopting, not rejecting similar reforms in this country.
It can be seen that these several objections constitute no great obstacle to
the establishment of supervision. It might also be argued, however, that the
existing criminal laws relating to embezzlement or tax evasion are adequate to
punish breaches of trust. But the report of New Hampshire that "loose and
distracted administration was found in about 25% of the cases,"'" suggests that
the presently existing law is not an adequate safeguard against mismanagement.
V
In drafting a Uniform Supervision of Charitable Trusts Act, the followng
problems must be considered: 1) Is there a need for uniformity? 2) Should all
charitable trustees be subject to supervision? 3) What specific provisions are
necessary to enable the Attorney General to carry out his "fact-finding" and
"suit-bringing" duties?
Uniform state legislation has been valuable in the fields of banking and commerce. In these areas a person frequently may be subject to the laws of several
different states in the same type of transaction, thus making detailed uniformity
desirable. However, the problem of supervision of charities is more like the regu,
lation of corporations in which the laws of only one state are applicable. Uniform corporation registration is desirable because of the possibility that the
corporation will shift its registration to the state with the most lenient rules.
However, if a charity is required to register in the state where most of its property is located, the possibility of shifting to states with less supervision is almost
eliminated. In fact, even as to charities which could change the situs of their
property, the value of uniformity could be achieved only if there were substantially identical supervision in all the states, a nearly impossible goal. Furthermore, the provisions of a Uniform Act would have to be "watered down" so that
they would be acceptable to every state, regardless of its size, constitution,
number of trusts, or internal administrative framework. The very fact that a
"permissive" Act has been drafted which provides that the Attorney General
"may" require trustees to file reports and that trustees shall file copies of the
creating instrument "if" requested to do so92 shows the extent to which a Uniform Act might become a mere gesture if its main object wai to establish identical practices in all 48 states. Those states which wanted to establish really
effective enforcement might even be held back by a "watered down" Uniform
Act. What is needed is not uniformity, but effective supervision regardless of the
form of the machinery, in all states.
90 215 L.T. 32 (Jan. 16. 1953).
11N.H. Attorney General's Report (1942-44).
" § 2 of the "permissive" Act. See note 4, supra.
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On the other hand, the draftsmen of a "Model Act" could ignore the peculiarities of individual states and construct a statute which would be a "model"
of the best method for supervising charities. Then, if the legislature of a given
exstate felt compelled to eliminate certain parts of the Act, the omissions or
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in the future" could be added at the end of the definition of "charitable trust"
to preclude a narrow interpretation of "to deal."
At this point, the Model Act provides for the supervision of all charities, regardless of their legal form. However, some people will undoubtedly insist that
this or that type of school, church, or Ford Foundation should be specially exempted from making reports. The churches might claim constitutional immunity, and the schools that they are already supervised by the state. The difficult
task of defining which charities have an adequate excuse for not making reports
to the Attorney General should be left to the individual states. Generally,
though, the fact that the Attorney General has always been a proper party to
enforce religious and educational trusts,95 and the fact that the taxpayers are
granting these large charities a substantial exemption-subsidy on the assumption that they are pro bono publico seem to indicate that there is no reason why
the community should not at least be entitled to a report of the bono publico.
Only when some other supervision equals the standards of the general charitable
supervision should organizations be exempted from the coverage of the Act.
The implementation of the Act is the one remaining problem to be discussed.
The tentative draft of the "mandatory" Uniform Act already includes some of
the basic provisions that should appear in a "Model Act." Section Two provides
that every trustee shall file a copy of the instrument creating the trust with the
Attorney General, and Section Three requires the trustee to render an annual
report to that officer. These are the all-important fact-finding sections. Other
provisions give the Attorney General power to make rules and regulations,98 to
establish and maintain a record of reports, . 7 and to allow inspection of the records at reasonable times and for legitimate purposes. 98
Besides these basic sections, there are others that should be added in order
to keep the Attorney General informed about litigation which occurs "between
reports."
A section that is being presented for the first time in the Texas and Ohio bills
is the provision that the Attorney General must be a necessary party to and
must be notified of all judicial proceedings affecting a charitable trust within
the state. "A judgment rendered in such proceedings without service of citation
upon the Attorney General shall be void, unenforceable, and subject to collateral attack.""9 This is an excellent way of insuring that the Attorney General
is informed about litigation which could harm a trust before he can take steps
to protect the charitable interest. 100
16E.g., State ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Van Buren School District, 191 Ark. 1096, 89 SW. 2d
605 (1936), and cases cited in 62 A.L.R. 881, 883 n. 8.
"6Handbook, op. cit. supra note 93, at §4.
97Ibid., at § 7.
98Ibid., at § 8.
99Tex. H.B. No. 538, § 4 (1953); § 109.25 of the proposed Ohio Act.
100The Attorney General of Ohio in a speech recommending supervision, said, "The whole
purpose of the trust may be changed by application of the cy pres doctrine, and there is no
provision for the representative of the public to be heard. A short time ago an attorney ap-
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The requirement that the Attorney General be informed and made a party
does not, however, preclude the possibility of his granting leave to interested
parties to conduct the suit by using their own counsel. As a matter of fact, where
state funds are limited and where the number of beneficiaries is rather small, it
might save money to allow such a practice. The Attorney General could even
notify interested parties of a breach of trust and suggest that they bring the
suit with his approval, but with the proviso that he must accept the judgment
before it is valid against the charity so that he reserves the right of appeal. He
should, of course, retain his duty to bring suit if the interested parties refuse or
later withdraw.
The Texas and Ohio bills contain a provision for notifying the Attorney General when any will that contains clauses creating a charitable trust is brought
to the probate court; no compromise, settlement, agreement or judgment which
modifies or terminates the charitable trust is valid unless the Attorney General
is a party thereto, nor may the trust be modified or terminated by decree of
the probate court unless the Attorney General is given an opportunity to be
heard.' 0' The Model Act should certainly include such a provision, since it is the
only effective way of preventing a settlement detrimental to the charitable purpose and assuring that the court is reminded-in this case by arguments presented by the Attorney General- that cy pres may very well be applied in order
to save the gift for charity.
Besides the provisions for gathering information, the Model Act should include a section which states "regardless of any language in the agreement, deed,
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C. 'William O'Neill, Att'y Gen., to Montgomery Co. Bar Assn.
§ 109.29 of the proposed Ohio Act, and Texas H.B. No. 538, § 6 (1953).
is used in R.I. Pub. Laws (1950)
' Tex. H.B. No. 538, § 17 (1953). A similar provision
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